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MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN
AVIATION ACCIDENT CASES
GEORGE E. FARRELL*

N 1961 a crisis occurred in the federal courts when multiple
anti-trust suits were brought against the electric equipment industry.1 There were 25,623 separate claims for relief in 1,912 civil
actions filed in thirty-five federal district courts involving these
anti-trust suits. Because of the congestion to the court system

caused by these suits, experienced judges and members of Congress
recognized the need for a new approach to this type of massive
litigation. Consequently, section 1407 of Title 28 was enacted.

This statute created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
and empowered it to transfer civil actions to other districts for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings when the transfer

would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions and
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses.!
The technique developed in the electrical cases was thought to be
usable in other potential multidistrict litigations, including those

cases arising from air disasters. Accordingly, actions arising from
* A.B., Stanford; J.D., De Paul; Member of District of Columbia and New
York Bars; Office, Washington, D.C.
I Address by Chief Justice Warren, American Law Institute, May 16, 1967,
reported in THE MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION at 6
(rev. ed. 1970) [herein after referred to as MANUAL].
2 Subsection (a), 28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1970) provides: "When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts,
such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation authorized by this Section upon its determination that transfers
of such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the Panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings 'to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any
claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such
claims before the remainder of the action is remanded."
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air crashes are routinely consolidated for pretrial proceedings in
accordance with section 1407.
I.

SHOULD SECTION

1407

APPLY TO AVIATION DISASTER CASES

In his tribute, in recognition of the extraordinary effort on the
part of the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation and the
participating judges in the electrical equipment civil anti-trust litigation, Chief Justice Warren commented:
If it had not been for the monumental effort of the nine judges on
the Committee of the Judicial Conference and the remarkable cooperation of the thirty-five district judges before whom these cases
were pending, the district court calenders throughout the country
could well have broken down.'
The electrical anti-trust litigation was indeed a tremendous undertaking with remarkable results. It is questionable, however,
whether the consolidated pretrial proceedings, which were so beneficial to the anti-trust suits, will be equally appropriate to litigation arising from air disasters. The legislative history of section
1407 indicates that Congress expected that pretrial transfers would
be ordered only when significant economy and efficiency in judicial
administration would be obtained.' Although actions arising from
aviation accidents involve common questions of fact, the litigation
is seldom "complex"' since general tort principles, procedures and
remedies are involved. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether the transfer of cases that are not complex would enhance the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, or promote judicial efficiency. In some
instances the litigation has been made complex by the courts and
overzealous attorneys attempting to follow the recommendations
made in the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation.
As further evidence that aviation accident litigation might not be
appropriate for consolidated pretrial proceedings, experience indicates that litigation arising from air disasters has not been a burden
on the courts or judicial administration. At this writing, there have
I See

note 1 supra.
'See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
1 See MANUAL at 26, wherein "complex litigation" is defined as "one or more
related cases which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary
treatment, including but not limited to the cases designated as 'protracted' and
'big'."
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been only twenty-two aviation accidents considered by the Panel.'
Each accident has involved few cases and even fewer trials have resulted. Pretrial procedures are generally routine and the preliminary

information, such as facts surrounding the accident, the witnesses
involved, the applicable technical data, flight data and cockpit recorder read-outs, air traffic control and radio transmissions are all

covered by the investigation of the National Transportation Safety
Board or the Federal Aviation Administration.!
Moreover, consolidation has imposed a financial burden on
plaintiffs in the aviation disaster cases by increasing the time and

cost of preparation. The apparent necessity to gear the proceedings
to the slowest common denominator is one of the reasons why trial
preparation time following consolidation under section 1407 has
been unacceptably long; more than two years." In addition, con' In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport (Constance, Ky.) on
Nov. 8, 1965, Docket No. M.D.L.-8A (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Greater Cincinnati Airport on November 20, 1967 (Constance, Ky.), Docket
No. M.D.L.-8B (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Ardmore, Okla., Docket
I (J.P.M.L.); In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C.,
No. M.D.L.Docket No. M.D.L.-13 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Hong Kong on
June 30, 1967, Docket No. M.D.L.-15 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Falls City, Neb. on August 6, 1966, Docket No. M.D.L.-17 (J.P.M.L.); In re
Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Ind., Docket No. M.D.L.-30 (J.P.M.L.);
In re Air Disaster at Santa Monica Bay, California, Docket No. M.D.L.-34
(J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, Docket No. M.D.L.-38
(J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Bradford, Penn., Docket No. M.D.L.42A (J.P.M.L.) (Dec. 12, 1968); In re Air Crash Disaster at Bradford, Penn.,
Docket No. M.D.L.-42B (J.P.M.L.) (Jan. 6, 1969); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Hanover, N.H., Docket No. M.D.L.-43 (J.P.M.L.); In re San Juan, P.R.
Air Crash Disaster, Docket No. M.D.L.-47 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Maracaibo, Venezuela, Docket No. M.D.L.--48 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air
Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No. M.D.L.-64
(J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at San Antonio, Venezuela, Docket No.
M.D.L.-72 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Las Vegas, Nev., Docket
No. M.D.L.-80 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mandeville, La., Docket
No. M.D.L.-84 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Denver, Colo.,
Docket No. M.D.L.-88 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Huntington,
W.Va., Docket No. M.D.L.-94 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Anchorage, Alaska, Docket No. M.D.L.-95 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Tweed-New Haven Airport, Docket No. M.D.L.-96 (J.P.M.L.).
'Accidents involving civil aircraft are investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board, and the facts, conditions, and circumstances of each accident and the probable cause thereof, is reported. The report is made public in
such form and manner as is deemed by the NTSB to be in the public interest.
The Federal Aviation Administration is delegated the investigative authority for
some accidents. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
8 Some of the actions consolidated by the orders of the Panel listed below are
not yet terminated: In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport on
Nov. 20, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 353 (J.P.M.L. 1967); In re Mid-Air Collision Near
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solidation has increased the workload of the courts by requiring unnecessary supervision of the cases. Further, consolidation unduly
favors the defendants by delaying trial or settlement.
II.

CONSOLIDATION CRITERIA

In 1967, when preparing section 1407 (a), Congress contemplated that not all cases would be transferred for consolidation simply
because they involved common questions of fact since it was doubted that transfer would enhance the convenience of parties and witnesses or promote judicial efficiency. Once the decision to transfer
was made, Congress contemplated that a number of facts should be
considered in the selection of a transferee district including the state
of its docket, the availability of counsel and sufficient courtroom
facilities.! Only on three occasions has the Panel felt that the factors
did not warrant consolidation and thus denied the transfer of the
aviation cases."
It has been customary to consolidate the anti-trust and other
complex litigation in the larger districts while the aviation cases
have been consolidated in the districts where the crash occurred,
which typically were smaller districts." A consequence of this consolidation of aviation litigation in smaller districts has been the substantial increase in the case load of those districts, resulting in delay in trial preparation. 2 Section 1407(a) prescribes that actions
may be transferred to "any" district," but the Panel has apparently
established its own precedence, and in at least one opinion has cited
its previous consistency as support for its ruling that cases arising
from an Indiana accident should be consolidated in Indianapolis."
Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (J.P.M.L. 1967); and In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 261 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
9

See note 4 supra, at 1901.
'n re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (J.P.M.L.
1969); In re Air Disasters, Bradford, Pa., Docket Nos. M.D.L.-42 A and B, Not
Reported (J.P.M.L. Hearing, September 25, 1970).

"For example, the Panel reported that the type of litigation transferred during 1970 to districts with five or more judges included nineteen of twenty antitrust, patent and SEC groups of multidistrict litigation and only two of ten groups
of cases arising from common disasters; See also Peterson & McDermott, Multidistrict Litigation, 56 A.B.A.J. 737, 741 (1970).
"Report of J.P.M.L., October 1970.
"See note 2 supra.
"In re Air Crash Disaster at Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L.

1970), when the Panel stated: "We have consistently held that the district en-
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If the location of the transferee court has marginal transportation
facilities, however, then travel time alone can add months to pretrial proceedings by hampering the availability of attorneys and
witnesses. In addition, if the physical facilities of the small district
are inadequate, the practice of the Panel in transferring aviation
disaster cases to the situs of the crash could result in uncooperative
witnesses and angry attorneys. More realistic considerations for selection of the transferee forum would be: a central geographic location; an adequate transportation facilities; an adequate court
staff; an adequacy of judges, both in number and familiarity with
the issues; an adequate number of clerks and clerical personnel; the
availability of experienced reporter personnel; adequate documentary reproduction facilities; adequate facilities for the taking of depositions and storage of documents in the courthouse; convenience
for the attorneys involved; and adequate hotel and restaurant facilities.
Subsection (a) of section 1407 provides that an action will not
be transferred unless the Panel determines that it will be for "the
convenience of the parties and witnesses" and will promote "the
just and efficient conduct" of the action transferred. 5 Although the
"convenience of parties and witnesses" appears to be an admirable
criterium for transfer, as a practical matter it is seldom a consideration. Primarily the attorneys, and not the parties, participate in
the pretrial phase of the lawsuit; rarely are there eyewitnesses to an
air crash. The witnesses testifying in aviation accident litigation are
airline employees, the employees of the aircraft manufacturer and
technical personnel employed by the United States. Interestingly,
the final draft of section 1407 did not contain the terms "for the
convenience of the parties."" In the pretrial stages of this type of
litigation, more fruitful considerations should be given to the convenience of the courts and the attorneys since they are the main
participants in pretrial proceedings.
compassing the situs of the crash is generally the most appropriate transferee dis-

trict for litigation of this type."
1528 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970).
"' See Hearings on S. 3815 before Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, of Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 101, 104, 134
(1967). The inclusion of the terms "for the convenience of parties" was recommended by a subcommittee witness who also happened to have been defense

counsel for one of the electrical equipment manufacturers.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Judicial efficiency and the just and efficient conduct of actions
that are transferred are not promoted by the consolidation of only
two or three cases with common questions of fact that are pending
in different districts." Taken to its extreme, however, consolidation
has even been ordered when the five victims of the crash were all
represented by the same attorney; consideration iseven being given
to the consolidation of a common air disaster in which there are
only two actions pending. 9 Neither the convenience of parties and
witnesses, nor judicial efficiency, will be enhanced by consolidation
of these cases.
When consolidation is opposed by all the parties, it should not
be required. Occasionally, however, the Panel has taken the opposite position when plantiffs and defendants agreed that consolidation was not required, but when the parties failed to show that they
would be inconvenienced by transfer."0
III. CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Despite the theoretical uniformity provided by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in practice each district has its own discovery
methods."' Thus if the litigation is truly multidistrict then pretrial
proceedings in the transferee court should conform to practice in
the various districts. In addition, other discovery practices should
be followed to provide for complete and meaningful discovery. It
is important that the court allow liberal discovery. Moreover, the
transferee court should require that all requested documents be produced, subject only to in-camera inspection in the event of objec17See

note 4 supra. See also note 17 supra, at 129.

18In re Air Crash Disaster at San Antonio, Venezuela, Docket No. M.D.L.-

72 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (unreported case).
re Air Crash Disaster at Huntington, W. Va., Docket No. M.D.L.-94
191In
(J.P.M.L.) (no opinion at this writing).
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No.
M.D.L.-64 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (unreported case).
21 For example, at the first pretrial hearing after transfer of the Fairland,
Indiana air disaster litigation, the defendants were ordered to produce all liability

documents that they considered relevant; in the Fairland, Indiana litigation the
production of the cockpit voice recorder tape was excluded, whereas it was or-

dered produced by the court in the Hendersonville, North Carolina litigation;
further, in the Hendersonville, North Carolina litigation the accident coordinators'

reports were excluded, whereas in the Puerto Rico air disaster litigation such
documents were ordered produced; See also United States District Court for New

Hampshire Ruling on Government's Objections to Production of Documents,
dated December 28, 1970.
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tion. At the time of production, the documents should also be
marked for identification and a representation should be made by
the party producing the document that it is genuine as of the date
of the accident and whether it was kept in the regular course of
business. In the deposition phase of the pretrial proceedings, the
transferee court should require that deposition questions be answered, subject only to the objection provisions of the Federal
Rules."
Presently, the Manual procedures are not readily adaptable to
aviation accident litigation. An attempt by the transferee court to
follow the Manual unduly complicates the pretrial proceedings in
litigation, which itself is not complicated. Most of the preliminary
procedures that are designed to provide the names and location of
witnesses, location and custodian of documents and information of
the transaction upon which the claims for relief are based, are duplicative and time consuming since this information is already available to the litigants through the NTSB or FAA investigations and
hearings. Consequently, discovery on the merits of the litigation
can, and should, begin immediately upon commencement of the proceedings.
The procedures of multidistrict litigation also provide for the appointment of liaison counsel,23 time restrictions," provisions for
"tag-along" and "catch-up" cases,' and together with the recommendations of the Manual and court interpretations, can unduly
restrict the attorney in the representation of his client. If carried to their extreme, these procedures may deny a client the representation of his choice. Passage of section 1407 contemplated

"3FED. R.

Civ. P. 30(a) provides that in a deposition upon oral examination:

"Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections." Federal rule 32(d)

provides that all objections to testimony taken by oral deposition are reserved to
time of trial except those with respect to form.
2"MANUAL Part I § 1.9.
" For example, the transferee courts routinely establish completion dates for
certain phases of pretrial proceedings; this is not objectionable when the time per-

mitted is commensurate with the complexity of the proceeding involved.
25By orders filed February 25, 1971, and March 8, 1971, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, in consolidated litigation
arising from the TWA accident at Cincinnati, ordered that it was "unnecessary"
for certain "catch up" cases to engage in discovery proceedings, and no repetitive
discovery would be permitted, which effectively precluded participation in any

pretrial proceedings.
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centralized management of the litigation with court supervision'
and not court take-over.
With more liberal pretrial procedures and attorney cooperation
assured by positive and standardized court direction, even the most
complicated aircraft accident case should be prepared for trial in
a maximum of six months.
IV.

TRIAL IN THE TRANSFEREE COURT

As proposed to Congress, section 1407 was designed to only
affect the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. By limiting the
application of section 1407 to "pretrial proceedings" the intention
was to restrict the consolidation simply to the practice and procedure that precedes the trial of an action. Moreover, these procedures
generally involved deposition and discovery, and would be governed by Federal Rules 16" and 26"' through 37." Consequently,
Congress intended that section 1407(a) would require the transferred cases to be remanded to the originating district at the close
of coordinated pretrial proceedings; the statute's language did not,
therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings." Section 1407 (a) requires the Panel to remand each action at
the conclusion of the pretrial proceedings, unless the law suit was
previously terminated." Notwithstanding the clarity of the statute's
language, one transferee court has conducted a trial on the issue of
liability alone and another transferee court has conducted a trial of
certain selected cases for all purposes.
For example, the United States District Court for New Hampshire ordered, pursuant to sections 1404 (a) and 1406 (a), that the
"See note 4 supra.

2'At the first pretrial hearing in actions transferred to Indianapolis, Indiana,
see note 12 supra, a proposed discovery schedule was presented to the court.
Since it was a mid-air collision, the cause of the accident was known, and less
extensive discovery was required. Although not accepted by the court, it is be-

lieved that the content and time sequences are valid. The schedule submitted
would permit complete preparation for trial in six months from the first pretrial
meeting, including discovery of documents, depositions (twelve technical witnesses), interrogatories and requests for admissions.
"1FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
"9 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
30FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
"See note 4 supra, at 1900-0 1; See note 17 supra, at 21.
See note 2 supra.
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cases before it for pretrial proceedings be consolidated for trial on

the issue of liability." Also in another situation, the trial of selected
cases was ordered both on the issues of liability and damages.'
Conducting a trial on consolidated cases is objectionable for several reasons. First, the trial of liability is not a pretrial procedure
pursuant to section 1407, nor is it authorized by sections 1404(a)
or 1406(a). Second, separate trials on liability and damages may
violate the guarantee of trial by jury' as well as rule 42(b)" and
section 2072 of Title 28." The typical aviation case does not have

the complexity to warrant the pretrial judge to handle the trial on
liability simply because of his knowledge of the case. Moreover,
separate trials on liability and damages do not reduce the case load

in the judicial system. Thus consolidation for any reason other than
pretrial is unnecessary.
The Second Circuit in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord" considered the power
of the transferee court to transfer to itself for all purposes, sua spon-

te, the cases previously consolidated for pretrial. The Second Circuit
pointed out that the only power given the Panel is under section
1407." Moreover, section 1407 seems to limit the discretion and
power of the transferee court to order transfer under section
1404(a). Thus it would seem that the transferee court would have

no greater authority than the Panel with respect to those particular
actions consolidated by the Panel. Further support for the argu"U.S. Dist. Court for New Hampshire, Order and Memorandum, filed June
3, 1971.
"U.S. Dist. Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Entry dated Nov. 4,
1971.
"U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
IFED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides that separate trials may be ordered under
certain circumstances, "always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by statute
of the United States."
3728 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) provides that the Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules of practice, etc., but "such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by
jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." See In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport (TWA)
298 F. Supp. 353 (J.P.M.L. 1968) wherein the Panel refused to sever the issue
of damages prior to transfer for determination by the transferor court; United
Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
924 (1961) wherein it was held that the issues of liability and damages could
not be separated when questions of exemplary damages were involved.
-447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
39Id. at 124.
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ment that section 1407 cases are to be remanded to the transfer
court is seen in the rejection of an amendment that would have
added a section 1408 to give the Panel the power to transfer for
all purposes."0
Another way the remand provision of section 1407 can be circumvented is when the transferee court schedules an immediate
trial at the close of the pretrial proceedings."' Accordingly, this
practice could collaterally estop litigation in the transferor district
that could not be brought in the transferee district because of jurisdictional considerations. The scheduling of an immediate trial
would also effectively exclude the participation of other parties to
the litigation and effectively determine all cases by the transferee
court in complete disregard of the statute. The procedure is getting
through the backdoor what could not be obtained through the front
door.
Finally, the apparent intention of the courts to terminate multidistrict litigation in the transferee district deprives the litigants of
the traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how to enforce their substantive rights or assert their defenses. Neither is Van
Dusen v. Barrack' a cure-all. In Van Dusen, the Court held that the
transferee court must apply the same substantive law to the case as
the transferor court would apply. Choice of law has tremendous
effect on damages and the litigants' choice of forum should not be
denied.
V.

SHOULD THE PANEL BE A COURT? OR IS IT?

Since the Panel is given explicit judicial powers under section
1407, it is obvious that it is more than an administrative body.
" See Hearings on S. 961 before Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1969). Section
2 of S. 961 would have amended Ch. 87, Title 28, U.S. CODE, by adding Section
1408, giving J.P.M.L. authority to transfer for pretrial and trial.
1 See note 31 supra.
-2376 U.S. 612 (1964). See also U.S. District Court for New Hampshire,
Order and Memorandum Opinion, filed June 3, 1971, wherein the court noted,
"Moreover, the interest of justice, in my opinion, requires that the plaintiffs from

other jurisdictions must not be compelled to litigate the issue of damages in a
state which has a $60,000 death limit in wrongful death actions. While .. .the
New Hampshire death limitation would not apply to those cases originating in

other districts (unless that state's conflict of laws rule so dictates), it would be
naive and unrealistic to assume that New Hampshire jurors would not be aware
of the death award limitations."
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While it may not directly supervise pretrial proceedings in the transferee court, the Panel nevertheless "retains an active interest in and
responsibility for ensuring that the transferred litigation is processed
efficiently, expeditiously and economically."' In addition, the Panel
has obtained periodic status reports from the transferee judges and
has brought them together to discuss their mutual problems with
members of the Panel and with the editors of the Manual. Although
these procedures are apparently the result of cooperation by the
transferee judges, the broad authority given to the Panel by section
1407(f) to prescribe rules for the conduct of "its business" could
be interpreted as authority to supervise transferee courts in the
conduct of pretrial proceedings.
The Panel denies that it has appellate authority over the transferee court, and has stated that "[slection 1407 does not authorize
the Panel to act as an appellate forum for every litigant disgruntled
by the rulings of a transferee judge."" The Seventh Circuit also
seemed reluctant to consider the appeal of a ruling by a transferee
judge in Allegheny v. LeMay." The court pointed out that the basis
for jurisdiction to consider the lower court ruling would be found
either in Rule 54(b) ' or in section 1292(b) of Title 28. Accordingly, if the appeal is based upon a ruling that is not a final judgment, or if the district judge declines to certify the opinion for immediate appeal, then the litigant has little if any opportunity for
further remedy. As the court stated in LeMay,"' the courts of appeal
have not shown any interest thus far in utilizing mandamus to compel certification by a district court judge.
From the meetings with transferee judges and the status reports
submitted, the Panel has the greatest awareness of the problems and
progress of the transferred cases and would be in the best position
to insure uniformity by timely and informed rulings on disagreements that arise during the pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation. If the Panel were acknowledged to be a "complex and multidistrict litigation" court, then it could provide the necessary uniformity through close and continuous supervision of the transferee
' See note 2 supra.
"Leslie Plumbing v. Crane J.P.M.L. Opinion and Order, Oct. 20, 1971.
'
F.2d - (7th Cir. 1971).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
"' See note 45 supra.
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court and could therefore provide appellate direction over interlocutory rulings on matters pertaining to pretrial proceedings. Thus
these procedures, if implemented, would be a substantial contribution to judicial efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In conclusion, the following recommendations concerning multidistrict litigation arising from aircraft disaster cases are respectfully submitted:
1. Give stability to section 1407 by following legislative intent,
or amend the statute;
2. Do not consolidate merely because the cases arise from airplane crashes;
3. Permit lawyers to control litigation;
4. If consolidation is necessary, choose a district that has adequate court and logistical facilities;
5. Institute a workable pretrial schedule for aviation cases by revising the Manual to include an aviation subsection; and,
6. Give the Panel court status and appellate review authority
over pretrial proceedings.

